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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The relationship of the judiciary to the legislature is necessarily close, inasmuch as a large part of the court's time is spent
in interpreting and applying law created by legislature. On
the other hand legislative bodies in their turn, exercise considerable power over the judiciary. For one thing, legislative
appropriations are necessary for the maintenance and operation of the judicial departments. Then too, *where provisions
of organization and tenure are not completely set forth in the
Constitution, it becomes the duty of the legislature to make such
provisions as are necessary. 1 This places a large control of the
judicial department in the hands of the legislature. 2
Certain judicial powers have also been retained by legislative bodies. 3 The power of impeachment is one instance of this
kind. Up to date this power has been sparingly used in this
country and the independence of the executive and the judiciary
'The Constitution of the United States, for example, provides that
the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and In such
inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Consequently, Congress can determine the number of judges
appropriate for the Supreme Court and create any additional tribunals
which appear necessary for the transaction of federal business. Thus
it might reduce the number of judges by providing that on the death
or resignation of any of them the vacant post shall be abolished; then
at the proper moment it might increase the number of judges to secure
the appointment of men to its liking. The most outstanding example
of legislative activity in this regard took place in 1802 in Jefferson's
administration, when Congress repealed a law providing for sixteen
circuit judgeships which President Adams had filled with Federalists
the year before.
2In 1809, the legislature of Ohio passed an act declaring that the
Constitution was to be interpreted as vacating all seven-year appointments in 1810, not excepting cases in which the current incumbent
had been appointed to fill a vacancy caused by the death or resignation of the original holder. By this use of this provision, the legisla.
ture was able to reconstruct the judicial personnel of the state. Three
supreme court judges, three president judges of the common pleas
courts, all the associate judges of that court (more than a hundred in
number), and all of the justices of the peace of the state, were removed
by this so-called "sweeping resolution." See Rufus King, Ohio, First
Fruit o1 the Ordinance of 1787 (1888), p. 314. For an interesting
account of the rivalry between the legislature and judiciary in early
Ohio, see William T. Utter, "Judicial Review in Early Ohio," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XIV, pp. 3-26; also "Saint Tammany in Ohio: A Study in Frontier Politics," Ibid., Vol. XV, pp. 321-340.
'M. M. Voorhies, "Judicial Functions and Powers of Congress,"
Virginia Law Review, III, pp. 632-641 (June, 1927).
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have not been affected by it.4 It could be used, however, in
such a way as to seriously interfere with the work of the
courts. In view of its comparatively limited use in the past,
however, it would seem that the courts have little to fear in
this connection.0
The most important point of contact existing at the present
time between the legislature and the judiciary arises from the
power of the courts to review the constitutionality of legislation
and refuse to enforce that which they declare unconstitutional.
The principle that an act of legislation contrary to the law
under which a legislative body is organized is invalid was familiar to Americans long before the Constitution was adopted.
Before the Revolution, colonial legislation was frequently stibjeeted to review by the Privy Council,7 and both before and
4 The United States Senate has sat as a Court of Impeachment in
the cases of the following accused officials:
William Blount, a Senator of the United States from Tennessee:
Blount expelled; charges dismissed on various grounds; Monday, Dec.
17, 1798, to Monday, January 14, 1799.
John Pickering, Judge of the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire; removed from office; Thursday, March 3,
1803, to Monday, March 12, 1804.
Samuel Chase, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States; acquitted; Friday, November 30, 1804, to March 1, 1805.
James H. Peck, Judge ot the United States District Court for the
District of Missouri; acquitted; Monday, April 26, 1830, to Monday,
January 31, 1831.
West H. Humphreys, Judge of the United States District Court
for the middle, eastern, and western Districts of Tennessee; removed
from office; Wednesday, May 7, 1862, to Thursday, June 26, 1862.
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States; acquitted; Friday, March 3, 1876, to Tuesday, August 1, 1876.
William W. Belknap, Secretary of War; acquitted; Friday, March
3, 1876, to Tuesday, August 1, 1876.
Charles Swayne, Judge of the United States District Court for
the northern district of Florida; acquitted; Wednesday, Dec. 14, 1904,
to Monday, Feb. 27, 1905.
Robert W. Archbald, Associate Judge, United States Commerce
Court; removed from office; Saturday, July 13, 1912, to Monday, January 13, 1913.
G. W. English, District Judge of Illinois; resigned; March 25, 1926,
to Nov. 10, 1926.
OR. Foster, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
pp. 505-53 (1895); D. S. Alexander, History and Procedureof the House
of Representatives, Ch. 17; D. G. Thomas, "The Law of Impeachment
in the United States," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. II, pp. 378-395 (May,
1908); A. Simpson, A treatise on Federal Impeachements (1917);
Extracts from the Journal of the United States Senate in all Cases
of Impeachment, 1798-1904, 62nd Cong., 2nd. Sess., Sen. Doe. No. 876
(1912).
'Before the Revolution, the validity of an act could be tested by
an appeal to the King in Council to set aside the enactment of a
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after the adoption of the federal Constitution, courts in a
number of states had held state statutes in conflict with state
constitutions to be invalid.8
Although neither the federal Constitution 9 nor any of the
state constitutions expressly recognize or sanction this so-called
colonial legislature, or by an appeal from the decision of a colonial
court. These powers were not lightly considered. In fact, it has been
estimated that some 8,563 acts of the American colonies were submitted to the Privy Council, of which 469 were disallowed. Imperfect records of the Privy Council make it impossible to determine how
many of these were set aside because ol lack of authority on the part
of the legislature to enact them, but enough is known to indicate that
the proportion is large. (See Russel, The Review of Colonial Legislation by the King in Council; Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade.) In addition to appeals from the enactments of colonial legislatures to the Privy Council, there were also
appeals from the decisions of colonial courts. Included in this group
were three well known cases: (1) Winthrop v. Lechmere (1727-8),
Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, I, 34; (2) Philips v. Savage
(1738), Acts of the Privy Council, III, 432; (3) Clark v. Tousey (1745),
Acts of the Privy Council, III, 540. The records of the Privy Council
are imperfect in this connection also. In consequence it is almost impossible to determine how many of the cases appealed to it from the
American colonies, aggregating more than 260 in number, were based
on an alleged conflict between a legislative enactment and a colonial
charter. See A. M. Schlesinger, "Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council," Pol. Sci. Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 279, 433; Hazeltine, Appeals from
the Colonial Courts to the King in Council, Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for 1894, p. 299. See Lawrence B.
Evans, Cases on ConstitutionalLaw, pp. 253-255.
sThe rights of the courts to invalidate acts of the legislature had
been exercised in at least five states before the constitutional convention assembled. As early as 1780, the highest court of New Jersey
asserted the right of the courts to determine the validity of acts of
the legislature in the case of Holmes v. Walton. (See The American
Historical Review, Vol. IV, 456.) In 1782, in the case of Commonwealth
v. Caton, the same doctrine was asserted in Virginia; in 1784 in the
case of Rutgers v. Waddington it was asserted in New York; in 1786
in the case of Trevett v. Weeden, decided in Rhode Island, a similar
view was expressed (See Arnold, "History of Rhode Island, Vol. It,
Ch. 24; Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation,
p. 234 ff.; Kent, Commentaries, 12th ed., pp. 450-453); and in Bayard v.
Singleton, decided in 1787 in North Carolina, the court aserted a
similar principle. (All of these cases except Holmes v. Walton are
printed in Thayer, Cases, I, 55-83.) See also B. F. Moore, The Supreme
Court and Unconstitutional Legislation (1913), Ch. I; C. G. Haines,
The Conflict Over Judicial Powers in the United States to 1870 (1909),
p. 21; Lawrence B. Evans, Cases on Constitutional Law, pp. 255-256.
1 In the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, and in the state
ratifying conventions as well, the question was frequently raised as
to what would happen in case Congress should adopt an act which
contravened or exceeded the powers with which it was vested. This
discussion is summarized in Melvin, "The Judicial Bulwark of the
Constitution," The American Political Science Review, VIII, p 167; see
also Elliot's Debates, III, 553; III, 325; IV, 155; II, 196; II, 151;
IV, 257; II, 489; see also the Federalist.
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doctrine of unconstitutionality; it is nevertheless generally considered to be a part of the state and federal jurisprudence.
Both the state and federal courts have without exception
recognized and applied the doctrine, apparently with the general consent of the people. This does not mean that the doctrine
has been accepted from the beginning of our system without
question. 10 As a matter of fact, some time elapsed after the
"0"There is no evidence," says Arthur N. Holcombe, "in the Constitution or bill of rights of any of the original states, that the
judiciary were originally looked to by the Fathers as the special
guardians of the Constitution. On the contrary, the implication is decidedly the other way. In New York, for instance, the judiciary were
certainly expected to accept the construction of the Constitution
adopted by the council of revision, or in the last instance by the court
of errors, a court in which the judicial element was in a minority.
In most of the states, moreover, the principle of the separation of
power was either not logically worked out, as it was in New York, or
not recognized at all.

.

.

. The governments of the original states,

. were for the most part, governments characterized by the
supremacy of the legislature, and if judicial interference with legislative acts was sometimes tolerated, the operation of the governmental
system was not consciously altered thereby.

. . . The main reli-

ance of the framers of the Massachusetts Constitution for the protection of the rights of the people was placed in the legislature. (See
Art. 12.) This was also the case in the beginning throughout the
United States." State Government in the United States, 1928, pp. 62-63;
see also, pp. 49-62. In ten of the original states the judges were
arbiters of all constitutional questions, in the sense that they had the
same right as the other departments of government to construe the
Constitution, with the added advantage that they acted upon constitutional questions as a rule, after the other departments of government
had acted. See A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United
States (1928), p. 66. The governments of Vermont, Rhode Island and
Connecticut were not as strongly influenced by the doctrine of the
separation of powers as were the other states. Characterized by legislative supremacy the governments of these states gave small opportunity for judicial interference with legislative acts. Chipman's
Sketches of the Principles of Government (1793), pp. 119-127. In
Pennsylvania and Vermont an attempt was made to prevent abuses in
the exercise of legislative and executive powers, by the establishment
of a council of censors, instead of through judicial action. These councils were compelled to ascertain whether the Constitution had been
preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and
executive branches of the government had performed their duties as
guardians of the people, or had assumed to themselves, or exercised
other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution.
The Pennsylvania Council of Censors was established in 1776 and continued in operation till 1790. It was not successful. [See Allen Nevins.
The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775-1789
(1924) ].The Vermont Board of Censors was created in 1777 and existed
until 1870. The system seems to have worked better in Vermont than
in Pennsylvania. See L. H. Meader, "The Council of Censo~s," in
Papers from Historical Seminary of Brown University (1899); Arthur
N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (1926), pp. 58,
59, 77-80; W. F. Dodd, State Government (1928), pp. 115-116. In both
states the existence of the council of censors may have delayed the
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setting up of the national government and our first state government before the doctrine was put into effect. The constitution" itself is silent concerning the question. 12 Although it
exercise of judicial review by the courts. W. F. Dodd, Revision and
Amendment of State Constitutions, 1910, pp. 34-42. W. C. Morey, "The
Genesis of a Written Constitution," Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.
(April, 1871); "The First State Constitution," Ibid. (Sept., 1893).
"Although the Federal Constitution contains no provision conferring upon the courts the power to invalidate acts of the legislature,
it was apparently looked upon by some members of the constitutional
convention of 1787 as being an inherent part of the judicial power.

[See Warren, Congress, The Constitution and the Supreme Court.
(1925), Chs. 2-41. Alexander Hamilton was prominent in this group.
"There is no position which depends on clearer principles," he said,
"than that every act of delegated authority contrary to the tenor or
commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act,
therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this,
would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than the principal; that
the servant is above the master; that the representatives of the people
are superior to the people themselves; that mere men acting by virtue
of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but
what they forbid." (The Federalist, No. 78, Dawson's Ed.) ". . . .
Where the will of the legislature, declared in statutes," he said,
"stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the
former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental
laws rather than by those which are not fundamental." (The Federalist, Dawson's Ed., p. 542.)
""Nor can there be much doubt that the members of the Convention were also substantially agreed that the Supreme Court was
endowed with the further right to pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. The available evidence strictly contemporaneous
with the framing and ratification of the Constitution shows us seventeen of the fifty-five members of the Convention asserting the existence
of this prerogative in unmistakable terms and only three using language that can be construed to the contrary. More striking than that,
however, is the fact that these seventeen names include fully threefourths of the leaders of the Convention, four of the five members of
the Committee of Detail which drafted the Constitution, and four of
the five members of the Committee of Style which gave the Constitution its final form. And these were precisely the members who expressed themselves on all the interesting and vital subjects before the
Convention, because they were its statesmen and articulate members."
Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution, pp. 11-12. See also C. A.
Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, p. 126; Charles Warren, Congress, The Constitution, and the Supreme Court. On the other
hand it has been contended by some writers that sentiment in the
federal convention was on the whole unfavorable to the idea of granting the judiciary the power to declare acts of Congress invalid. These
writers contend that the exercise of such a power is a usurpation. See
William Trickett, "Judicial Dispensation from Congressional Statutes,"
American Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 65; "The Great Usurpation," American Law Review, Vol. 40, p. 356; "Judicial Nullification of Acts of
Congress," North American Review, Vol. 185, p. 848; L. B. Boudin,
"Government by Judiciary," Pol. Sci. Quarterly, Vol. 26, p. 238; Address by Chief Justice Walter Clark of North Carolina, Congressional
Record, July 31, 1911; also The Indepe'ndent, Sept. 26, 1907.
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would be a difficult if not impossible task' 3 to set forth the
exact time when the doctrine of judicial review was accepted
by the American people, ecrtain important steps can be noted.' 4
The doctrine was set up as a national principle in 1803 in
the case of Marbury v. Madison.15 After that decision, the
"'There has been much controversy as to when the principle of
Judicial review was actually recognized in this county. See J. B.
Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Iaw," Legal Essays, pp. 1-41; "Life of John Marshall," Chs. 3-4;
A. C. McLaughlin, The Courts, the Constitutions, and Parties (1913);
C. A. Beard, Te Supreme Court and the Constitution (1913); J.]Er
Dougherty, Power o1 Federal Judiciary Over Legislation; Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution; Rawle, On the Constitution,
Ch. 21; Wilson, Law Lectures, Vol. 1, p. 460; Bowman, "Congress and
the Supreme Court," Pol. Scl Quar., Vol. 1, p. 20 ff.; Boudin, "Government by Judiciary," Pol. Sci. Quar. (1911), p. 258 ff.; Powell, "The
Supreme Courts," Pol. gel. Quar. (1922), p. 468 ff.; Warren Congress,
the Constitution and the Supreme Court (1925), Chs. 1-3.
.4In May, 1791, the United States Circuit Court declared a Connecticut statute invalid because contrary to the treaty of peace with
Great Britain. In 1792, in the case of Bradsford v. Spalding, the same
court made a similar decision in Georgia. In 1793, in the case of Higginson v. Greenwood, the United States Circuit Court in South Carolina
decided the same way. These cases anticipated the case of Ware v.
Hylton (1796), 3 Dallas, 197, in which the United States Supreme
Court took the same view as to the supremacy of a treaty over a state
statute. The Federal Circuit Courts held other state statutes invalid
In Connecticut In 1793, in Pennsylvania in 1795, and in Vermont in
1799. In 1792 the United States Circuit Court in Pennsylvania rendered the first decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional
In Hayburn's Case (1792), 2 Dallas 409. See Warren, The Supreme
Court in United States History, I, 65 ff.
111 Cranch 137. In this case Chief Justice John Marshall in a classic
statement asserted the proposition that a Constitution Is fundamental
law, that legislative and executive powers are limited by this fundamental law, and that the courts as Interpreters of the law, must preserve and defend the Constitution. "The powers of the legislature"
he said, "are defined and limited; and that these limits may not be
mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose
are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended
to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited
and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the
persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts

allowed are of equal obligation.

.

.

.

The Constitution is either a

superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it Is
on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part
of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power,
in its own nature illimitable." For a criticism of the decision In this
case see E. S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review and the Constitutiov, Ch. 1 (1914); J. A. C. Grant, "M1'arbury v. Madison Today,"
Amer. P o. Scl. Rev., Vol. 23, pp. 673-681 (Aug., 1929); A. C. McLaughlin, "Marbury v. Madison Again," Amer. Bar Assoc. Journ., Vol.
11, pp. 155-159 (Mar., 1928); see also Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sarg. & R.

I- L. J.-7
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doctrine was accepted quite generally by state courts, state legislatures, and the people generally. 16 By 1818, the power of
the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation was
recognized in every state but Rhode Island and the courts were
largely following the lead of Marshall in proclaiming the independence of the Judiciary. 17 As a result of this trend, the
principle of the separation of powers was perfected and the
system of checks and balances was made a workable substitute
for the earlier practice of legislative supremacy.
In the beginning the doctrine of judicial review was exercised infrequently and with great caution by the United States
Supreme Court' s and the state high courts as well. 19 During
(Pa.) 330 (1825); also in Thayer, Cases, I, 133; Jackson's veto of the
United States Bank Bill; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, II, 581; also speech by Roscoe Conkling, April 16, 1860,
Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Session, App. 233.
16 In
1808, two judges of the Supreme Court of Ohio were impeached for declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional, and
were removed from office. See F. R. Aumann, "The Course of Judicial
Review in the State of Ohio," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 25, May, 1931,
pp. 36-38; William T. Utter, "Judicial Review in Early Ohio," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 14, pp. 3-26; Utter, "Saint Tammany in Frontier Politics," Ibid., Vol. 15, pp. 321-340; T. M. Cooley,
"Constitutional Limitations" (7th S.), p. 229, note; C. G. Haines, "The
American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy."
11The doctrine of judicial review, as stated by Justice Woodbury
of New Hampshire in 1818, came to be the rule adopted in every state.
See Merril v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 204.
:"From its institution in 1789 to July 1, 1924, the Supreme Court
has disposed of about thirty thousand cases. In fifty-three cases, it
has held acts of Congress unconstitutional. Three of these cases:
(1) United States v. Todd, 13 Howard 40 (1793); (2) Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); and (3) Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard 393
(1857); were decided before the Civil War. Fifty of the cases have
come since then. For a list of these cases see Lawrence B. Evans,
Cases on Constitutional Law (1925), p. 262. See also Warren, Congress,
the Constitution and the Supreme Court (1925), Ch. 9. A list of federal and state statutes and municipal ordinances, held unconstitutional down to 1911, may be found in Moore, The Supreme Court and
Unconstitutional Legislation (1913), Studies in History, Economics,
and Public Law, Columbia University, Vol. LIV, App. III, pp. 139-141.
The total number of measures held invalid by the United States
Supreme Court during this period amounts to 279. Of this number 32
measures were held invalid between 1790 and 1850; and some 247
were held invalid between 1850 and 1911. In Martin and George, American Government and Citizenship (1927), somewhat different figures
are set forth.
u For the period 1776 to 1819, C. G. Haines lists only eighteen
cases in which state statutes were held invalid by state courts. See
The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, p. 228. Although this
list is incomplete it indicates the trend. During the first half century
of Ohio's statehood, there were only seven officially reported cases In
which the Ohio Supreme Court declared acts of the state legislature
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the formative period of American political institutions, that is,
the period from 1789 to 1861, the number of laws,20 state and
national, invalidated by the courts, was extremely small as
compared to the number invalidated since that time. 21 As a
matter of fact, the Civil War period may be said to introduce
a new era in American judicial history. From that time on
judicial power expanded rapidly all over the country.
There were several reasons for this expansion. Constitutional changes explain the matter in part. The growing complexity of state constitutions and the increasing number of
limitations necessarily encouraged state judicial supervision
over statutory enactments. 22 Important changes in the federal
constitution immediately after the Civil War were also an iminvalid, in whole or in part, on constitutional grounds. After 1851,
however, such restraint is not apparent in the work of the Ohio
Supreme Court. Since that date it is safe to say that the supreme
court has declared acts of the legislature Invalid in no less than 200
cases. See F. R. Aumann, "The Course of Judicial Review in the State
of Ohio," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 25, pp. 371-372 (May, 1931). In
this connection see E. S. Corwin, "The Establishment of Judicial Review," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 9, p. 314.
Only thirty-seven state acts were declared unconstitutional by
the federal courts before 1860. From 1860 to 1910 the federal courts
declared one hundred and eighty state acts invalid. See B. F. Moore,
The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation (1913), Studies
in History, Economics, and Public Law, Columbia University, Vol.
LIV, App. III, pp. 139-141. See also Jackson H. Ralston, Study and.
Report for the American Federation of Labor Upon Judicial Over
Legislatures as to Constitutional Questions (1923).
=In the brief span between 1903 and 1908, 400 state laws were
held invalid by the courts, state and federal. Charles G. Haines, The
American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, p. 307. All but 28 of these
vetoes were by state courts. A count by B. B. H. Meyer of the Library
of Congress of state legislation (including constitutional provisions
and municipal ordinances as well as ordinary laws) invalidated by the
United States Supreme Court between 1910 and 1922 shows a total of
166 such cases in the eleven years. See CongressionalRecord, Vol. 64,
Pt. 5, pp. 4566-4570.
" Prior to the year 1912, 285 acts or parts of acts had been declared unconstitutional by the state courts of Yew York. Of this number, barely one per cent was enacted under the original Constitution
of 1777, and not much more than two per cent under the second Constitution of 1821. Of the number remaining, about three-fifths were
enacted under the Constitution of 1846, and about two-fifths under the
Constitution of 1894. See H. H. Davis, The Judicial Veto. In Illinois,
cases involving the constitutionality of legislation have multiplied as
legislative restrictions have been increased by successive revisions of
the Constitution. The greater part of this increase came during the
last thirty years. More cases involving constitutional questions were
decided between 1890 and 1913 than between 1820 and 1870. Ill. Const.
Conv. Bull., No. 10 (1920), p. 847 if.; B. F. Moore, "The Judicial Veto
and Political Democracy," Amer. P1ol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 10, pp. 700-709
(Nov., 1916).
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portant factor. 23 As a result of the thirteenth, fourteenth2 4
and fifteenth amendments, the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over state legislation has been completely changed. 25 Important
changes in the economic life of the country 26 also tended to
increase the business of the courts, enlarge their jurisdiction,
and expend their structure.
23 See C. W. Collins, The Fourteenth Amendment
and the States,
Philadelphia (1912).
Between 1889 and 1918, the United States
Supreme Court decided 790 cases in which the validity of state laws
was attacked under the "due proces of law" and "equal protection of
the law" clauses. See Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United
States History, III, 463; also note W. F. Dodd, State Government
(1929), pp. 133-139; A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United
States (1926), pp. 435-437.
-"Before the adoption of the Foutreenth Amendment, due process
of law in the states was guaranteed only by state constitutions and
the guarantee was given a restricted interpretation. See Edward S.
Corwin, "Due Process of Law Before the Civil War," Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 24, p. 375. Since that time, however, the United States
Supreme Court has become a veritable censor of state legislation. Consequently the tribunal has exercised a large influence in shaping the
industrial and economic development of states by controlling the character of legislation affecting such development. Whether or not the
states have been held in narrower bounds in the exercise of their
police power, as a result of this transfer of power is a moot question.
Viewed in the light of some cases which could be cited, the conclusion
would seem to favor the affirmative. In this connection one might list
the following: Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915);
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921); Minimum Wage Board v. The
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923). On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of the United States has been somewhat more liberal
in its interpretation of the "due process of law" clause and "police
power" than many state courts. [See R. A. Brown, "Due Process,
Police Power, and the Supreme Court," 40 Harvard Law Review
943-968 (May, 1927); Edward S. Corwin, "Judicial Review in Action,"
74 Univ. of Penn. Law Rev., pp. 639-671 (May, 1926)].
25In 1877, in discussing the growing tendency to raise questions
under the Fourteenth Amendment the court said: ". . . it would
seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and the
arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration Is looked
upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the
abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of the
justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded." Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1877). In 1885, in a vigorous protest against
the continued exercise of this practice it said: "This court Is not a
harbor where refuge can be found from every act of ill-advised and
oppressive state legislation." Missouri Pacific Ry. Go. v. Humes, 115
U. S. 512, 520 (1885).
". . . The range and intensity of governing political, social,
and economic forces are accurately reflected -in the volume and variety
of federal litigation. This is markedly illustrated by the era beginning
with the defeat of the Confederacy. . ...
Peace brought with it an
accelerated industrial development, partly because normal processes
which had been put up, during the war, were released, and partly be-
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From the Civil War period till the present, the federal
courts have continued to expend their power. 27 The state
Their work
courts, have met with a similar experience.
was increased not only because of the comprehensive character
of the newer constitutions which defined in detail the organization and function of the various branches of the government, 28
but also by their tendency to follow the example of the federal
courts in a frequent application of the "due process clause." 2 9
Moreover, there arose a tendency in many states to construe
constitutional limitations as limiting the legislative powers very
strictly.3 0 There was a good reason for this development. The
cause of their intensification by the war. The transcontinental railroads increased domestic commerce tremendously. The railroads
steadily pushed the frontier westward. They brought economic penetration of the Northwest and Southwest. Population and politics
followed in their wake. The public domain became territories and the
territories states. Even more significant perhaps, was the repercussion
of railroad development upon our foreign trade. America became a
great food exporter. Contemporaneous advances in steam navigation
furthered this industrial expansion." Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court, 1929, pp. 56-57. The forces which combined to introduce a new economic and social order into American life
in the sixties and seventies affected the state courts likewise.
0 In 1873 in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace 36, Justice
Miller in advocating a restricted construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment, expressed the fear that any other view of its meaning
would constitute the Supreme Court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states, and upon the civil rights of their citizens, with
authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those
rights, as they existed at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. Professor E. S. Corwin in commenting on this matter in
19-, was of the opinion that Justice Miller's apprehension had been
realized. Professor Corwin points out that whereas, there were only
seventy-one cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment between
1868 and 1889, there were one hundred and ninety-seven cases between
1890 and 1901. See his article "Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before
the Civil War," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 24, p. 366; and his "The
Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment," Michigan Law Review. Vol, 7, p. 671. For a good statement as to the manner in which
the "due process" clause has been given a wider meaning and application by the courts see A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United
States, pp. 435-442 (1926).
"W. F. Dodd, State Government, pp. 86-93 (1928).
"Between 1870 and 1913, there were 115 cases before the Illinois
Supreme Court under the "due process" clause, and considerably more
than one-half of these cases arose after 1900. See Illinois Con-titutional Convention Bulletin, No. 10 (1920), p. 847 ff.
"State constitutions are
30 See Ohio Constitution, Sec. I, Art. 20.
not grants of power, but limitations of power. Such legislatures can
exercise such powers as are not inhibited by the fundamental law.
To construe the provision in question as a grant of authority is to impute to the framers the doing of a useless and idle thing." Scott v.
Flowers, 60 Neb. 675 (1900). To avoid this kind of restrictive interpretation the Oklahoma Constitution of 1907 provides that "any spe-
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attitude of the people towards the courts had undergone a
change. Losing confidence in legislative bodies in the forties
and fifties, the people in nany states turned hopefully to the
judiciary.3 1 In constitutional conventions held in the middle
of the century in many states the judiciary was given a more
independent siatus.32 In some states the increased use of judicial review followed immediately in the wake of constitutional
provisions for the popular election of judges and for stricter
eonstitutional limitations upon legislative powers and procedures.3 3

Indeed the power of the courts has grown so rapidly since
the Civil War that our system has been characterized by a
French commentator as a "government by judges'.3 4 According to this observer the final control of the social and economic
policy of the country is vested in the courts. It is undoubtedly
true that under such broad constitutional provisions as the "due
process of law" clause, the courts do fix the limits of legislative
power and accordingly determine policy in connection with
social and economic legislation.35
cific grant of authority in this constitution, upon any subject whatsoever, shall not work a restriction, lfmitation or exclusion of such
authority upon the same or any other subjects whatsoever."
"See A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States
(1928), pp. 110-112.
312Constitutional conventions were held in New York (1846); Wisconsin (1848); California (1849); Kentucky, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
Virginia (1850); Indiana, Maryland (1850); Ohio (1851); Louisiana
(1852); Tennessee (1853); Kansas (1855); Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon
(1857). The adoption of popular election in Mississippi in 1832,
marked the beginning of a swing to this system. By the time of the
Civil War popular election had been written into nineteen of the thirtyfour state constitutions. See W. S. Carpenter, Judicial Tenure in the
United States, pp. 180-182.
"3Where laws had formerly been invalidated by the courts to protect their own constitutional rights, they were now invalidated because of defective legislative procedure, or because of conflict with the
"due process of law" clause of the federal constitution or its equivalent
in the state constitutions. Before the Civil War, the state courts were
on the defensive. During this period they used their power to invalidate statutes to protect their own constitutional rights. They now use
it to invalidate the results of incorrect legislative procedure and to
maintain the integrity of "due process." In consequence it is the
legislative body which is now on the defensive. See Charles G. Haines,
The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, p. 288; F. R. Aumann,
"The Course of Judicial Review in the State of Ohio," Amer. Pol. Sc.
Rev., Vol. 25, pp. 370-371 (May, 1931).
14 Edward Lambert, Le Gouvernment des juges et la lutte contre la
legislation sociale aux Btata-Unis (Paris, 1921); Walter F. Dodd, "The
Growth of Judicial Power, Pol Sci. Quar., Vol. 24, p. 193 ff.
3This
tendency has been particularly marked in our state govern-
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In recent years, considerable opposition has arisen to the
power and practice of judicial review, principally because of
decisions which have nullified social and economic legislation or
the ground that it contravened the "due process of law"
clause. 30 Dissatisfaction arising from these decisions has been
increased by the prevailing uncertainty as to the meaning of
the phrase "due process.'' 37 In the opinion of many, the
ments. The states exercise that wide range of authority called the
"police power," which includes all regulative authority to promote the

health, safety, good order and morals of the community. In its
broadest sense this power includes all legislation and almost every
function of civil government. [Barbier v. ConnoZly, 113 U. S. 27
(1885) ]. It is not subject to definite limitations, but is co-extensive with
the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interest. (Camfield v. U. S., 167 U. S. 518.) Being the most general and least defined
of the inherent powers of government, it necessarily imposes a large
responsibility of interpretation on the judiciary. The judiciary has
retained its authoritative position by refusing to define the term dnd
reserving to itself the right to determine whether any act is warranted
under that power or not. Remaining undefined, the "police power"
like that other vague phrase "the due process of law" clause, is left
wholly within the keeping of the judicial conscience. The resulting
Interpretation largely reflects the personal opinions and general social
and political theory of the judges. In consequence different judges may
take completely different views of the same problem. This actually
amounts to fixing public policy, rather than determing a question of
law. See Geo. W. Alger, The Old Law and the New Order (1913), pp.
149-178; 237-261.
"But now the court, in accordance with what it denominates the
'rule of reason' in effect inserts in the act the word 'undue,' which
means the same as 'unreasonable,' and thereby makes Congress say
what it did not say, what, as I think, it plainly did not mean to say,
and what, since the passage of this act, it has explicitly refused to
say. It has steadily refused to amend the act so as to tolerate a
restraint of interstate commerce even where such restraint could be
said to be 'reasonable' or 'due.' In short, the court, now, by
judicial legislation in effect, amends an act of Congress relating
to a subject over which that department of the government has exclusive cognizance." Statement of Mr. Justice Harlan in United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 105 (1911).
1The courts have never attempted a precise definition of "due
process," preferring to arrive at its meaning by the gradual "process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of decisions as they arise."
Twbzdng v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Although refusing a
definition of due process, it has declared that in the Fourteenth Amendment "it refers to that law of the land in each state, which derives its
authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted
within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the basis of all our civil and political institutions, and the
greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make
their own laws and alter them at their pleasure." Hurtado v. Californla (1884), 110 U. S. 515, 535. The lines which separate legislation
which is compatible with the "due process" clause from legislation
which is not "are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact
of decisions on the opposing sides." [Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U. S. 104, 112 (1911)].
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validity of a law under this clause depends not so much upon
any definitely ascertainable standard,3 8 or precise definition 0
as to -what constitutes "due process",40 but upon the "meaning" the court -wishes to give it.41 If we are to believe two observers as widely separated as Theodore Roosevelt' 2 and Justice
Cardozo, 43 we must accept the view that this "meaning" is
'Mr. Walter F. Dodd groups all constitutional provisions roughly
into four classes: (1) Narrow and definite constitutional standards
capable of application by a court without any great discretion as to
the interpretation or to the extent of the limitation. (2) Limitations,
broad in character, but still definite, and presenting something of an
objective standard by which to test the validity of legislation.
(3) Limitations, narrow in character, but so indefinite that they do
not present an objective standard by which the validity of legislation
may be tested. (4) Limitations, broad in scope and indefinite in character, which neither restrict themselves to the control of definite types
of legislative action nor present an objective standard by which to
test the validity of legislation. The provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law" and similar provisions in state
constitutions, as they have been applied since 1885, belong in this last
group. State Government, pp. 130-132.
"In applying "due process of law" the courts are guided by nothing
more definite than "the fundamental principles of justice and right
which the guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment is
intended to preserve." [Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921).] In
consequence we have courts dividing sharply as different judges have
different views as to what is "fundamental".
0 Although "due process" may be incapable of exact definition the
decisions of the court indicate that it possesses certain essential
elements, including: (1) Jurisdiction, the right to declare the law,
notice and hearing
which is the foundation of due process; (2)
which are fundamental attributes of due process in judicial proceedings; (3) An ascertainable standard of conduct to which it is possible
to conform which is also essential; (4) Opposition to laws which operate arbitrarily or unequally which is also a characteristic of due
process. [Grozza v. Tierman (1893), 148 U. S. 657. Evans, Cases on
Constitutional Law, pp. 957, 958 (1925).]
11See Radin, Theory of Judicial Decision (1925); 2 Am. Bar. Assn.
Journal, p. 359 ff.; Hutcheson, "The Judgment Intuitive-The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decisions," Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol.
14, pp. 274-288 (April, 1929).
', "The chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the
judges, because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they
interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of law, liberty,
they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy;
and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give direction to all
law-making. The decisions of the court on economic and social questions, depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the
peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth cenutry we shall
owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic
and social philosophy and not to an outgrown philosophy, which was
itself the product of primitive economic conditions." 43 Congressional
Record, Pt. 1, p. 21.
43"I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to
shape the form and content of their judgments. Even these forces are
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greatly influenced by the character and personality of the
judge; his predispositions and prejudices; his individual and
social background; his social and economic point of view;44
45
and all those diverse factors which give him individuality.
An analysis of the decisions of some of our great judges over
a period of years would certainly reveal some interesting facts
40
in this connection.
. . . Deep below consciousness are other
forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices,
the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions,
which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge. . . . There
has been a certain lack of candor in much of the discussion of the
theme, or rather perhaps the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must
lose respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to
human limitations. . . . None the less, if there is anything of
reality in my analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof
on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause
of truth by speaking and acting as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course,
and pass the judges by. We like to figure to ourselves the processes
of justice, as coldly objective and impersonal. The law, conceived of
as a real existence, dwelling apart and alone, speaks through the voices
of priests and ministers, the words which they have no choice except
to utter. This is an ideal of objective truth toward which every system
of jurisprudence tends. It is an ideal of which great publicists and
judges have spoken as of something possible to attain. . . . Marshall's own career is a conspicuous illustration of the fact that the
Ideal is beyond the reach of human faculties to attain. He gave to
the constitution of the United States the impress of his own mind;
and the form of our constitutional law is what it is, because he molded
it while it was still plastic and malleable in the fire of his own intense
convictions. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. 167-170.
'4 See Zechariah Chaffee, "Economic Interpretation of Judges," New
Republic, June 7, 1922; Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive, the Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision's," Cornell
Law Quarterly,Vol. 14, pp. 274-288,'April, 1929.
41"There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose
to call it philosophy or not (Cf. N. M. Butter, Philosophy, pp. 18, 43),
which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges
cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All their
lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been
tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social
needs, a sense in James' phrase of "The total push and pressure of the
Cosmos," which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine
where choice shall fall. In this mental background, every problem finds
its setting. We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None
the less, we can never see them with any eyes but our own. To that
test they are all brought-a form of pleading or an act of parliament,
the wrongs of paupers, or the rights of princes, or a village ordinance or a nation's charter." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. 12-13.
0 See Charles G. Haines, "Political Theories of the Supreme Court
from 1781-1885," Amer. PoZ. Sci. Rev., Vol. II, pp. 221-244 (Feb., 1908);
W. E. Dodd, "Chief Justice Marshall and the Constitution," Amer.
Hist. Rev., Vol. XII, pp. 776-787 (July, 1807); E. S. Corwin, John

seldom in consciousness.
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
47
economic life of the country underwent still further changes.
The older agricultural economy which had been the basis of
American society since its beginning gave way before an urban,
industrial order. A great mass of legislation was enacted to
meet the changing needs of the times. It was a trying period
for the courts. 48 Old landmarks lost their significance. Much
of the new legislation demanded by an industrial society collided
with the traditional constitutional and legal principles developed in an agricultural society.49 'When, because of modern
conditions a new policy such as a compulsory workmen's compensation law was passed, 50 there was a fair possibility that it
would be held unconstitutional as being opposed to one of the
broad guarantees of the state or federal constitution such as
the "due process" clause. 51
Marshall and the Constitution (New Haven, 1919); Albert J. Beveridge,
1Life of John Marshall, 4 vols. (Boston, 1916-1919); 0. K. McMurray,
"Field's Work as Lawyer and Judge in California," Cal. Law Rev., Vol.
5, pp. 87-107 (Jan., 1917); W. C. Jones, "Justice Field's opinions on
Constitutional Law," Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 108-128 (Jan., 1917); C. B.
Swisher, Stephen J. Field, Craftsman of the Law (Washington, 1930);
F. B. Clark, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan, Johns
Hopkins Univ. Studies in Hist. and Pol. Sci., Vol. 23 (1915); D. Richardson, ConstitutionalDoctrine of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ibid., XLII
(1924); Felix Frankfurters, "Constitutional Opinions of Justice
Holmes," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 10, p. 683 ff.; Joseph P. Pollard,
"The New Dissenters," The New Republic, Sept. 2, 1931, pp. 61-64.
4
•Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America (1930), pp. 20-26.
13-18, 164, 165, 169, 170; Geo. W. Alger, The Old Law and the New
Order (1913), pp. 238 fE.
4'Roscoe Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," Harvard Law
Rev., Vol. 21, p. 403.
4'Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921), pp. 112-65.
"See Geo. W. Alger, The Old Law and the New Order (1913),
pp. 38 ff.; 168 ff.; Walter F. Dodd, State Government (1928), pp. 124-25;
Johnson and Robinson, Readings in Recent American Constitutional
History, 1876-1926, pp. 335-370 (1927); Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law-Today," Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 32, p. 218.
"Dean Pound presents a summary of labor laws which courts
have disapproved in this connection. Included in this group we find:
(1) Legislation forbidding employers from interfering with the membership of their employees in labor unions; (2) legislation prohibiting
the imposition of fines upon employees; (3) legislation providing for
the mode of weighing coal in order to fix the compensation of miners;
(4) legislation against company stores, requiring employers to pay
wages in money; (5) legislation as to the hours of labor. "One cannot read the cases in detail" he says, "without feeling that the great
majority of the decisions are simply wrong, not only in constitutional
law, but from the standpoint of the common law, and even from that
of a sane individualism." "Liberty of Contract," Yale Law Journal,
Vol. 18, pp. 481-82. See also Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of
the Supreme Court (1928), pp. 191-98.
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In short, the social scheme was changing rapidly and there
were many people who viewed with alarm the shift from the
old traditional individualism of the country to a new and untried system, collectivistic in character. 52 It is not strange that
many members of the judiciary were included in this group.
The tenacious adherence of some courts to the principles of the
old order was brought to public attention time and again. It
was partlcularly conspicuous in cases where social and economic
legislation, enacted under the "police power" became involved
in a conflict with a broad, indeterminate constitutional provision such as the "due process" clause. 53 In these cases the
courts were not only exercising judicial authority but determining a question of public policy as well, and deciding it in such a
way as to defeat the will of the people as expressed in legislation 4
Criticism of this state of affairs appeared from all sides.55
Leaders of organized labor, social workers, lawyers5 6 and pub12Howard Lee McBain in discussing this situation said: "The
closing years of the old and the opening years of the new century witnessed an increasingly narrow application of constitutional inhibitions
upon social and labor legislation by some of the state courts. Statute
after statute was purged from the books by judicial pronouncement.
The Supreme Court, by reason of one or two unfortunate decisions,
came in for larger opprobrium than was its just desert. Lochner v.
New York, which annulled an eight-hour law for bakeries, became a
symbol of judicial tyranny. Decision in that cast, was handed down
In 1905. In the decade that followed there was a steady stream of
articles and books attacking and defending judicial review as an institution." The Living Constitution (1927), pp. 257-258; see Elihu Root,
"Judicial Decisions and Public Feelings," An Address Before the New
York State Bar Association, January 19, 1912.
In discussing this trend Charles G. Haines said: "In the Bulletin
of the Bureau of Labor for November, 1910, is a summary of one
hundred and fifty statutes and ordinances relating to labor which have
been held unconstitutional either entirely or in part. (Bureau.of Labor
Buzletin, Vol. 21, p. 916. "Labor Laws Declared Unconstitutional" by
Lindley D. Clark. For a summary of the nature of these acts, see
p. 942, passim.) The list includes a long line of enactments affecting
the contract of employment, the examination and registration of workmen, the employment of women and children, rates and payment of
wages, hours of labor, liability acts, protection to employees, and labor
organizations. (Ibid., pp. 922-24.) From a careful estimate of the effect
of these decisions it is a common observation that labor has borne the
brunt of the restrictive attitude of the courts toward legislative activity, and that there is warrant for the persistent hostility of labor
organizations to the American doctrine of judicial supremacy." The
American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, p. 331 (1914).
" Such legislation was defeated until the Constitution was amended
or the court was reconstituted.
11It was pointed out that the courts in invalidating legislation in

many cases insisted upon applying eighteenth century theories of
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licists as well, worked in unison to curtail the political power
of the judiciary by one means or another. 5 7 In both 1912 and
1924 judicial power was an important factor in a national
political campaign. This was not a novel experience for our
courts. 5 8 There had been opposition to the power of judicial
review, in one form or another, from the early history of the
country, 59 on to the present day, often resulting in proposals to
modify or abolish the principle altogether. 60
economics and social theory. See Ernest Freund, Standards of American Legislation (1917), p. 32; Walter F. Dodd, "Social Legislation
and the Courts," Pol. Sci. Quar., Vol. 28 (1913), p. 1 if.; Walter F.
Dodd, "The Growth of Judicial Power," Vol. 24, Ibid., p. 193 ff.; Seager,
"The Attitude of American Courts Toward Restrictive Labor Law,"
Pol. Sci. Quar., Vol.. XIX, p. 589 ff.; Holmes, "The Path of the Law,"
HarvardLaw Review, Vol. 10, p. 457 if; Groat, Attitude of American
Courts in Labor Cases.
'The case of Ives v. South Buffalo Railwaj, Co., 201 N. Y. 271-294
(1911), was one case which aroused wide spread opposition. Theodore
Roosevelt was particularly outspoken in his denunciation of this decision. [See Roosevelt, "Workmen's Compensation," Outlook, VoL 98,
pp. 49, 53 (May 13, 1911).] Conservative newspapers of the country
joined with Mr. Roosevelt in his censure of the courts. (See press
comments in Literary Digest, Vol. 42, April 8, 1911.) M6mbers of the
legal profession also joined in the protests made. [See Survey, Vol. 26,
p. 192 (April 29, 1911).] Teachers of constitutional law including
Andrew A. Bruce, Ernest Freund, Frank G. Goodnow, James Parker
Hall, Roscoe Pound and others, also protested this decision. See Outlook, Vol. 98, pp. 709, 710 (July 29, 1911); see also James P. Hall,
"New York Workmen's Compensation Act Decision," Journ.Pol. Econ.,
Vol. 19, p. 694; Ernest Freund, "Constitutional Status of Workmen's
Compensation," Illinois Law Review, Vol. 6, p. 432; A. A. Bruce, "The
New York Employers' Liability Act," Mich. Law Rev., Vol. 9, p. 684;
Edward Q. Keabey, "The Courts and the New Social Questions," Green
Bag, Vol. 24, 1911; Eugene Wambaugh, "Workmen's Compensation
Acts," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 25, p. 129; Notes in Col. Law Rev.,
Vol. 25, p. 129, and Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 24, p. 647.
51See Gilbert E. Roe, Our Judicial Oligarchy (N. Y., 1912); W. L.
Ransom, Majiority Rule and the Judiciary (N. Y., 1912); A. M. Kales,
Unpopular Government in the United States (Chicago, 1914), Ch. 17.
3"Charles G. Haines, "The Conflict Over Judicial Powers," Columbia University Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1; Ibid., "The American Doctrine
of Judicial Supremacy," pp. 200-247, 313-355; Ibid., "Histories of the
Supreme Court of the United States," Southwestern Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. IV, p. 1 ff.
19In the early history of the country the conflict over judicial
power was very bitter. Thomas Jefferson, the contemporary and
political antagonist of John Marshall, would never admit the paramount authority of the Supreme Court to determine the validity of
acts of Congress. In his opinion it was the design of the framers of
the Constitution to establish three coordinate and independent departments of government. Being equal and separate, each department
was equally empowered "to decide on the validity of an act according
to its own judgment and uncontrolled by the opinions of any other
department." To give the judiciary the power to pass upon the acts
of the other departments would be to make that department supreme.
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Opposition was particularly bitter during the time John
Marshall sat on the bench. 61 Before his appointment by John
This view was shared by many public men of his day. In Jefferson's
opinion all questions involving the constitutionality of acts of Congress

which might come before the court would be "political questions."
Although a statute might conflict with the Constitution, that fact
would not of itself endow the court with power to invalidate it. In fact
it would be the duty of the court to enforce the statute without questioning its validity. Jefferson also opposed the power of the court to
pass upon the acts of state governments. Admitting the supremacy
of the federal government in its sphere, he contended that to give the
federal judiciary the right to determine the validity of state laws
would enable the Federal Government to define its own sphere of
power and to destroy the sovereignty of the state.
"In the period immediately following the case of McCu77ough v.
Maryland, which was decided in 1819, the Supreme Court was subjected to a very bitter attack in this connection. In 1821, the Virginia
Assembly passed a resolution urging the abolition of the whole system
of review of state acts by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Spencer
Roane of Virginia drafted a proposed amendment to that end. In Ohio
and Kentucky vigorous resistance to nullification of state laws by the
federal courts was carried on. Ohio, which had previously passed a law
taxing each branch of the bank of the United States within its limits
$50,000, attempted to collect the tax in spite of the Supreme Court's
decision. It was compelled to recede from its position eventually but
Its attitude toward the Supreme Court remained unchanged for some
time. (See Ames, "Documents on Federal Relations," Senate Docu,
ments, 16th Cong., 2nd Session, XII, No. 72, pp. 6, 7. 8, 10, 11, 17, 18, 22,
25, 34;Osborn v. U. S., 9 Wheaton 738 (1824). In Kentucky, the opposition to judicial review was even greater, the state legislature protesting vigorously against the decision on Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton 1
(1823), which set aside the so-called "Occupying Claimant Laws," The
legislature demanded a reorganization of the court in such wise that
the concurrence of at least two-thirds of the judges should be necessary in an opinion affecting the validity of state laws. (See Ames,
State Documents on Federal Relations, pp. 12-23; Senate Document, 18th. Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IV, No. 69, p. 8.)
6 During these years there was a continuous asault upon the
courts. Judge Roane and John Taylor were two of the leading critics.
[See John Taylor, Construction Construed (1820); Tyranny Unmasked
(1822); New Views of the Constitution (1923).] There were many
others also, including Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, Congressman Stevenson of Virginia. In 1826 Senator Johnson proposed to
give the Senate appellate jurisdiction when the laws of a state were
questioned. In 1823, he discarded this suggestion in favor of a new
proposal which would require unanimous concurrence of the judges
to void a state law. (Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec.
10, 1822.) In 1822, Congressman Stephenson urged the repeal of the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary; and in 1831, the House Judiciary
Committee favored this same proposal. In 1824, the Senate Judiciary
Committee proposed that five out of seven votes be required for invalidating an act by the court. In 1825, came the most elaborate
criticism of all. It was in the form of a dissenting opinion. It was
made by Justice Gibson in the case of Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant and
Rawle (Penn.), 330 (1825). The expression by Justice Gibson appears
to be the most critical examination of the whole doctrine by one who
was opposed to judicial supremacy on the ground of principle and
policy. (See C. G. Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, pp. 235-246).
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Adams, only six decisions involving constitutional questions of
importance were decided. From 1801 to 1835, the period he
served as Chief Justice, sixty-two decisions were rendered.
Marshall, himself, wrote thirty-six of them. During this time,
some seven hundred and fifty-three cases were taken on appeal
from the lower courts. In nearly one half of these cases the
decisions were reversed. It did not take long for this activity
to develop a bitter opposition; so that the judicial tenure of
John Marshall was a period of conflict. "If, indeed, the judiciary is to be destroyed", wrote Story in the early part of this
period, "I should be glad to have the decisive blow now struck,
while I am young and can return to my profession and earn
an honest livelihood." Before Marshall came there was no controversy or criticism over judicial power. After he left, controversy was again stilled, 62 until a time when the Supreme
Court was drawn into the fierce struggle over slavery in the
Dred Scott case in 1857.63
The gist of the majority opinion in this case was that Congress had no power to prevent slavery in the territories. This
ran directly counter to the ideas of the new Republican party
which was working on the principle that Congress could and
should exercise that very power. There was a storm of protest
in the North. 64 Abraham Lincoln was an outstanding critic
of the decision.6 5 In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, 68 the Dred
62With the triumph of the Jacksonian group in 1828, a renewed
attack was made upon the doctrine of judicial nullification. Although
Jefferson and his followers had resisted the extension of the power
of the judiciary through Marshall's efforts, they were unable to prevent
this body from interfering greatly with the legislative enactments of
the state. In the "reign of Andrew Jackson" however, opposition to
judicial review was met with a sterner and more effective opposition.
During Jackson's administration the onward march of federal judicial
power was checked; the entire personnel of the Supreme Court was
changed; and some of Marshall's foremost decisions were modified
greatly. With Roger B. Taney serving as Chief Justice, the Supreme
Court was a changed body. Standing for a strict construction of the
Condtitution, a great respect for the rights of the state, and a lessening of judicial interference in the public affairs of the nation; this
reconstituted Supreme Court created by Andrew Jackson did not become involved in contests over the assertion of authority either with
the states or the department of the federal government.
819 Howard 393 (1857).
The legislatures of Connecticut, Maine, Ohio, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Massachusetts passed resolutions condemning the decision. (See Senate Misc. Doe. No. 14, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 1857-1858.)
Linco n and Douglas Debates, pp. 1-5.
his debates with Douglas, Lincoln drew upon the arguments
'm In
of Jefferson. Jefferson had attacked the idea that judges must be re-
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Scott decision was one of the most important issues.6 7 In 1860,
the Republican platform declared that "the new dogma that
the Constitution, of its own force, carries slavery into any or
all of the territories of the United States, is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with
legislative and judicial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency and subversive of the peace and harmony of the country." In his first inaugural address, Lincoln announced a doctrine that was in some ways a modified form of the view of
Andrew Jackson.6 8
garded as final arbiters of the Constitution; and held in higher esteem
than other men. He had also contended that the Constitution had
erected no such single tribunal to decide such questions; knowing
that, to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and
party, its members would become despots. (Works of Jefferson, Vol.
12, p. 163). Lincoln quoted this with approval. (Debates, p. 93.)
6 As the debate progressed Lincoln continued to take stronger
ground. In his speech at Edwardsville on Sept. 13, he said: "My
friends, I have endeavored to show you the logical consequences of the
Dred Scott decision, which holds that the people of the territory cannot prevent the establishment of slavery in their midst. . . . What
constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence? .
Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in us. Our
defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage of all men,
in all lands everywhere. Destroy this spirit and you have planted the
seeds of despotism at your own doors. Familiarize yourselves with
the chains of bondage and you prepare your own limbs to wear them.
Accustomed to trample on the rights of others, you have lost the genius
of your own independence, and become the fit subjects of the first;
cunning tyrant who rises among you. And let me tell you, that all of
these things are prepared for you by the teachings of history, if the
elections shall promise that the next Dred Scott decisions and all
future decisions will be quietly acquiesced in by the people." Nicolay
and Hay, Works of Abraham Idncoln, Vol. 11, pp. 109-111.
SLincoln said: "I do not forget the position, assumed by some,
that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court;
nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding, in any case, upon
the parties to a suit, as to the object of the suit, while they are also entitled to a very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by
all other departments of the government. And while it is obviously
possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still
the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with
the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent
for other cases, can be better borne than could the evils of a different
practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the
policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,
the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in
personal actions, the people have ceased to be their own rulers, having
to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands
of the eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon
the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink
to decide cases properly brought before them and it is no fault ofl
theirs if others turn their decisions to political purposes." Works,
Vol. 6, pp. 179-180.
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After enjoying a period of tranquillity during the major
part of the Civil War period the courts again became the object
of attention in 1867, when Mr. Williams of Pennsylvania introduced a bill to "regulate the practice and define the power of
the Supreme Court of the United States in certain cases arising
under the Constitution and laws thereof."69 Not content with
this proposal, the same legislator introduced a joint resolution
later in the year to amend "the Constitution in regard to the
judges of the supreme and other courts. "70 In 1868, Senator
Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of the Senate judiciary committee, reported a bill providing for the definition of "the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in certain cases."171 In 1869, he
again reported this bill. 72 The purpose of these various bills
73
was to limit the court's function of judicial review.
In 1895, criticism of the judiciary was renewed. In that
year the Supreme Court by a five to four vote reversed a previous decision in invalidating a federal income tax law."4 This
decision was criticized severely. Since the income tax law had
been enacted by a Democratic Congress, members of that party
were particularly outspoken in their protests. Controversies
over the use of the injunction increased the opposition to the
courts. When the Democratic National Convention met in
1C
Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 1st Session, p. 59.
"oIbid., p. 655.
11Ibid., 40th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1204, 1428, 1621.
121bid., 41st Congress, pp. 3, 27, 45, 96, 152, 167.

18The legislative history of this period records several attempts
to modify the practice of judicial review. In 1867, a proposal was made
that two-thirds of the entire court must concur in deciding adversely
on the constitutionality of any law of the United States. The Senate
judiciary committee reported it back with a substitute amendment
requiring five of the seven judges to constitute a quorum of the court,
but not requiring more than a majority for a decision. In this form
It passed the Senate on December 4, 1867.

(Congressional Globe, 40th

Congress, 2nd Session. p. 19.) The House judiciary committee in reporting it reinserted the proposal for a two-thirds vote. On January
13, 1868, the House rejected a proposal requiring a unanimous decision,
but passed the bill as reported by the committee, by a vote of 116 to
39. (Ibid., pp. 96, 478, 489.) The country at large did not seem to receive the proposal favorably, however, and when it was sent back to
the 'Senate, it was postponed sever'al times, and finally died in comc
mittee. [See Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States
History (1923), III, pp. 188-193; Congressional Globe, 40th Congress,
2nd Session, p. 503].
"'Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895),
and 158 U. S. 602 (1895). In this case the court held that an income
tax is a direct tax, thereby reversing its decision in Springle v. U. S.,
102 U. S. 586 (1880).
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J.896, the stage was set for a sharp indictment of the federal
judiciary. The Committee on resolutions 75 brought in a platform censuring the court and individual members76 expressed
themselves in no uncertain terms concerning the activities of
the Court.
From 1900 to 1912, criticism of the court continued unabated. The most persistent source of such criticism was to
be found among social reformers 77 and labor leaders. However, one need go no further than the Supreme Court itself to
find dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, the expanding character of judicial review7 8 Much of the criticism existing during this period was directed toward the "five-to-four" decision.7 9 Although there have been comparatively few80 such
decisions in the history of the Supreme Court, several of them
have unfortunately nullified laws in which great numbers of
" "We declare that it is the duty of Congress to use all the constitutional power which remains after that decision, or which may
come from its reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted,
so that the burden of taxation may be equally and impartially laid, to
the end that wealth may bear its due proportion of the expenses of
government." Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Party
(1896).
10"They criticize us for criticism of the Supreme Court of the
United States," said William Jennings Bryan. "My friends, we have
made no such criticism. We have simply called attention to what you
know. If you want criticism, read the dissenting opinions of the court.
That will give you criticisms. They say we passed an unconstitutional
law. I deny it. The income tax was not unconstitutional when it was
passed. It was not unconstitutional when it went before the Supreme
Court for the first time. It did not become unconstitutional until one
judge changed his mind; and we cannot be expected to know when a
judge will change his mind." Ibid.
" See Jane Adams, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 13, p. 772;
Florence Kelly, Ethical Gains Through Legislation.

"For a criticism of this tendency by the court itself, see C. G.
Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (1914), pp.
313-328.
11R. E. Cushman, "Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of
the Court." 19 Mich. Law Rev., pp. 771-803 (June, 1921)); F. R.
Savidge, "Five-to-Four Supreme Court Decisions," North American
Review, CCXIX, pp. 460-473 (April, 1924); Congressional Digest, Vol.
II, June, 1923. W. B. Munro, The Government of the United States
(Rev. ed.), pp. 410-412.
wEx parte Garland, 4 Wallace 333 (1866); Pollock v. Farmers
Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895); Fairbanksv. United States,
181 U. S. 283 (1901); Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908);
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U. S. 189 (1920); Kinckerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149
(1920); Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921); and Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).

K. L. J.-8

RENTuCKY L.w JouRNAL

people were interested."' In consequence, certain modifications
of the present arrangement have been proposed.
One of these proposals -would require the agreement of six
or seven of the nine justices in order to declare a law unconstitutional. 2 A second proposal would provide for a constitutional
amendment, permitting Congress to repass a law declared void
by the Court and give effect to it in spite of the decision of
the court. 83 A third proposal would abolish altogether the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes.8 4 Some people have also favored the adoption of an
easier method for the amendment of the Constitution. This
would indirectly limit judicial power 85
Efforts to limit judicial control which had persisted since
the turn of the century were given a new impetus in 1912 when
Theodore Roosevelt brought the matter to the attention of the
country in the campaign of that year. Important constitutional
changes were adopted in Ohio and North Dakota as a result.
Mr. Roosevelt was an advocate of the recall of judicial decision.8 7 This plan provided that where the court had declared
an act invalid, the matter might be submitted to a popular
referendum. If a majority of the electorate voted in favor of
the law, it would be maintained in force, notwithstanding th6
" A glance at the list of cases above indicates that every single
case was of extraordinary interest to one large group or another.
82See Congressional Digest, Vol. II, pp. 259-287 (June, 1923); see
remarks by Senator Borah in Senate Documents, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.
(Feb. 19, 1923), p. 3589. Constitutional amendments in Ohio and North
Dakota provide that statutes may be declared unconstitutional only
by an extraordinary majority of the court. See W. Rolland Maddox,
"Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio," Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol.
24, pp. 638-648 (Aug., 1930); F. R. Aumann, "The Course of Judicial
Review in Ohio," Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 25, pp. 367, 376 (May, 1931);
for criticism see Charles Warren, Congress, the Constitution, and the
Supreme Court, Ch. 6. See also State ex rel Jones v. Zangerle, 159
N. B. 564 (1927).
"Robert LaFollette advocated this plan. See Congressional Digest,
Vol. II, pp. 259-287 (June, 1923).
"In this connection see: C. W. Warren, "Shall We Remake the
Supreme Court? The Origin of Its Powers," Nation, Vol. CXVIII,
pp. 526-528 (May 7, 1924); Charles G. Haines, "Shall we Remake the
Supreme Court? The Practice of Other Countries," Ibid., pp. 553-556
(May 14, 1924); H. Hendricks, "Some Pros and Cons of Judicial Review of Legislature," Texas Law Review, Vol. III, pp. 134-151 (Feb.,
1925); R. L. Hale "Judicial Review versus Doctrinnaire Democracy,"
Amer. Bar Assoc. Journ., Vol. X, pp. 882-886 (Dec., 1924).
"Both Roosevelt and LaFollette advocated such a change.
ITThis proposal has been severely criticized. See Taft, Popular Government, p. 174 ff.; Wickersham, The Changing Order, Chs. 12-13;
Merriam, American Political Ideas, pp. 194-195.

THE DocTRNE OF JuDicIAL Rnviw
opinion of the court that it was -unconstitutional. A provision
of this character inserted in the constitution of Colorado, was
later declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court.88
In 1924, the courts were again subjected to attack. This
time the attack was led by Senator Robert LaFollette. Although a modification of judicial power was one of the chief
issues of the campaign of that year, the matter was soon lost
sight of with the defeat of LaFollette at the polls. Having successfully withstood the attacks of 1912 and 1924, the courts
continue to declare laws null and void when they deem them
to be in conflict with a superior law.8 9 From all present appearances public opinion in this country regards judicial control of legislation as a practice fundamentally sound in character, which should be maintained at all costs, without the interference of any restrictive limitations.
In this respect, our thinking as to the proper relationship
of the judiciary and the legislature is at variance with present
day thought on this matter elsewhere. 90 In fact, in most countries where the principle of judicial review has been adopted,
in whole or in part, it has had definite limitations imposed
upon it. The case of Switzerland is in point. Some form of
federal government has existed in Switzerland since the Middle
Ages. To render this system effective the federal court is
given the power to invalidate a cantonal law, if it finds it to be
"People v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Colo. 90 (1921);
People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100 (1921).
"Edward S. Corwin, "Judicial Review in Action," 'University of
PennslyvaniaLaw Review, Vol. 74, pp. 639-671 (May, 1926).
""The governments of the world may, with respect to judicial
review of legislation, be roughly grouped into the following classes:
(1) Governments in which the legislature interprets the fundamental
law. Examples: England, with an unwritten constitution; Chile,
France, Italy, and Switzerland, with written constitutions. (2) Governments in which the authority to interpret finally provisions of the
constitution, and as a consequence to invalidate acts in conflict therewith, is implied as a necessary requirement to maintain the equilibrium
between federal and state governments. Examples: United States,
Australia- Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. (3) Governments in which
the constitution grants authority to the courts to interpret the constitution and to prevent violations of its provisions. Examples: Columbia,
Czecho-Slovakia, Honduras, Irish Free State, Portugal. (4) Governments
In which the power is considered as belonging to the courts to review
the acts of coordinate departments but in which the power has been
exercised so infrequently as to have little significance. Examples:
Greece, Norway, and South Africa, prior to 1910." C. G. Haines, "Shall
We Remake the Supreme Courtf The Practice of Other Countries," Nation, CXXVIII, pp. 527-528, May 7, 1924.
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in conflict with the federal constitution or with federal laws.
But it has no authority to declare the unconstitutionality of a
federal law. The legislature of Switzerland is the final interpreter of the constitution, subject only to a referendum by
which such a decision may be changed. As a matter of fact the
federal constitution expressly declares that "the court shall
enforce all laws enacted by the federal parliament." This provision was inserted after a careful study and report on the
American system by a group of experts. 91 As a result the federal court of Switzerland, a government with the federal form
and a written constitution, has been precluded from assuming
the judicial supremacy which the United States Supreme Court
has acquired.
In constitutions adopted throughout the world since the
World War, the principle of judicial review has been given a
larger recognition than it has had in the past. Despite this fact
it does not seem probable that it will in any case acquire the
influence it has had in America. In the new constitutions of
Germany, 91* Austria, 92 Czecho-Slovalda, 93 Ireland, 94 China,95
'See Cunningham, The Swiss Confederation, p. 295; Brooks, Government and Politics of Switzerland, p. 166.
91*The new constitution of Germany asserts the supremacy of national laws over state laws and provides- that the superior judicial
court of the Reich may be called upon by the proper national or state
authority to decide whether a state law is compatible with the law
of the Reich when differences of opinion arise as to this matter. Under
the old constitution the courts exercised this power, but the decision
in such cases was conclusive only between the parties. Under the
new constitution, the question may be raised as an independent issue
by either the national government or a state government. When the
Supreme Court declares a state law inconsistent with a national law,
the effect is general, and the law is null and void for the future.
Although no power is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court to
declare a national law unconstitutional, it has been held that the court
has such a power. See Blackly and Oatman, "JudicialReview of Legislative Acts in Germany," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Feb., 1927, pp. 113-119.
"The new Austrian constitution gives the Supreme Constitutional
Court the exclusive power to decide upon the validity of federal laws,
at the request of the federal ministry. 'When a question of constitutionality is raised in due order in an actual case before the court,
a request by the ministry is unnecessary and the court may decide the
question on its own responsibility.
"' The new constitution of Czecho-Slovakia declares that legislative
enactments which are in conflict with the constitution are void. The
Supreme Constitutional Court is given the exclusive authority to
pass on such measures.
" The Constitution of the New Irish Free State expressly confers
upon the courts the power to decide upon the validity of legislative
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Rumania, 0 it has been given a place in the governmental system. On the other hand the new constitutions of Finland and
Yugoslavia make no mention of it and the recently adopted
constitution of Poland expressly denies to the courts the power
to inquire into the validity of statutes.
In the British Dominions and in Latin America the principle of judicial control has received favorable attention, judged
by some standards, but here again its acceptance in no wise
approaches the practice in this country. In Canada,9 7 Australia,9 s the Union of South Africa, 99 and the Irish Free
State it has been adopted in one form or another. In Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela, it also exists to some extent.
In conclusion it might be said that the principle and practice of judicial review has served a very useful purpose in this
country. The division of powers characteristic of a federal
system of government requires the presence of some supreme
arbiter to settle the problems arising out of this multiple distriacts which are alleged to be in violation of the Anglo-Irish treaty. A
right of appeal to the British Privy Council lies in such cases.
" The constitution of China proclaimed in 1923 expressly provides
that laws in conflict with the constitution are null and void.
1-The constitution of Rumania adopted in 1923 expressly confers
upon the court of appeal the right to decide on the constitationality
of laws and to refuse to apply those which are unconstitutional. The
decision, however, is limited to the case decided. The court cannot
render a decision upon the request of the government in hypothetical
case.
9 In Canada acts of the dominion and the provincial parliaments
which are in conflict with the British North America Act, and provincial acts which are contrary to acts of the dominion parliament
may be invalidated because of their unconstitutionality. Appeals may
be taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. See W. B.
Munro, Governments of Europe, pp. 274-276, 358-364 (1925); Charles
G. Haines, "Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada," Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 28, p. 565 (1914-15); W. B. Munro, The Constitution of
Canada, pp. 5, 219.
"In Australia when a law of a state is inconsistent with a law of
the commonwealth, the latter prevails and the former is deemed invalid. Although the power to decide the question of the invalidity of
a statute Is not expressly conferred upon the courts in Australia, they
have assumed the power, on the principle that it is an incident of the
judicial power and as such belongs to the courts. The courts of the
commonwealth and of the states both exercise the power of judicial
review. Not only are state laws held invalid but in some instances
acts of the commonwealth legislature as well. See Charles G. Haines,
"Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution of Australia," Harvard
Law Review, Vol. 30, p. 595 if. (1916-17); Charles Warren, Congress,
the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, p. 163.
"Smith, "Judicial Control of Legislation in the British Empire,"
Yale Law Journal,Vol. 34 (1925).
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bution of authority and its resultant conflicts.' 0' In our system
102
the Supreme Court has successfully filled this role.
Other advantages might also be cited. In the plan of
limited government contemplated by the framers of our system,
judicial review becomes almost an indispensable necessity. In
its absence, the distinction between constitutional law and
statutory law is largely broken down; the supremacy of the
Constitution has little neaning; the legislature is for the most
part the judge of its own powers; and individual rights conferred by *he Constitution would have a tendency to be uncertain if not insecure.
On the other hand, there is food for thought in the criticisms
which have been made of the practice. Laws enacted by the
chosen representatives of the people are abrogated by courts
which have not been selected to formulate rules for new relations
requiring legislation.' 0 3 The judicial department has been given
a power and position which most countries attempting a demo2'-Justice Holmes in a speech before the Harvard Law School
Assn. of New York at a time when the power of judicial review was
being criticized (Feb. 15, 1913), said: "I do not think that the United
States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states. For one
in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are
not trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies *what the Commerce Clause was meant to end." Collected
Papers, pp. 295-296 (1921).
1 2 In
discussing this subject Charles G. Haines says: "Where a
federal government is established some agency must delimit the powers
between the central and local governments. It has been quite common
to place this delimitation of powers upon the courts, and in a number
of federal systems the judiciary tests the validity of laws of the states
or provinces to discover whether they are in accord with the fundamental written law. This is the practice in Switzerland, where the
courts exercise such powers but are denied the greater authority of
passing on the acts of coordinate bodies. Judicial review of subordinate divisions is established in Australia, in Canada, and in the
new German constitution, and comprises the most important part of
judicial review in these countries. A similar review has been established in the federal systems of Brazil and Argentina. This type of
judicial review needs to be distinguished very carefully from the attempt of the courts to pass on acts of coordinate legislative bodies.
It is in the latter field where the courts exercise their most important
function in the review of legislation in the United States. "Shall We
Remake the Supreme Court? The Practice of Other Countries," Nation, Vol. CXVIII, pp. 553-556 (May 14, 1924).
1
1Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 21, p. 403.
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cratic form of government have hesitated to accept 04 in the
past and will probably refrain from accepting in the future.1 05
F. R. AUieN.

Ohio State University.

"I Burgess, "Political Science an
Constitutional Law," Vol. II,
p. 365.
" Charles G. Haines a careful student of the subject expresses the
opinion that the principle of judicial review will not take root completely: (1) In those countries in the continental system of government, whose legal foundations have been largely based upon the influeice and traditions of the Roman Law, where governmental authority emanates from the executive and not the legislative as in AngloAmerican countries; (2) in countries where constitutions are frequently revised and readily amendable; (3) in countries which have
adopted written constitutions, and have not inserted extensive bills
of individual rights, or have not included such general phrases as "due
process of law," or the "equal protection of the law" clause, by which
legislation is tested. "Shall We Remake the Supreme Court? The
Practice of Other Countries," Nation, CXVIII, pp. 526, 527 (May 7,
1924).

